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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GENDER-BASED
STATUTES OSTENSIBLY AIMED AT MALES:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF MICHAEL M.
v. SUPERIOR COURT
[Albsent a compelling reason for doing so, equal protection
forbids the law to foster one standard of socially acceptable
conduct for males and another for females.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of California's first penal statute in 1850, Cal-
ifornia law has imposed a criminal penalty upon any male who engages
in sexual intercourse with a female under a designated age, unless the
female is his wife.' The penalty is currently imposed by section 261.5
of the Penal Code, California's statutory rape law Until 1979, the
California Supreme Court consistently recognized that the purpose of
the statute was the protection of female virtue.4
In 1979, the California Supreme Court declared for the first time
in the statute's 130-year history that its purpose was the prevention of
pregnancy in minor unwed females.' The court held that despite its
discriminatory classification, section 261.5 did not violate the equal
protection provisions of either the California6 or United States7 Consti-
tutions. The court reasoned that because only females can become
pregnant8 and only males cause pregnancy in females, sex is the only
possible classification to identify victim and offender.9 In Michael M. v.
1. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 624-25, 601 P.2d 572, 583, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 340, 351 (1979) (Mosk, J., dissenting), aff'd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
2. 1850 Cal. Stat. 234, ch. 99, § 47 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West
Supp. 1981)). The statute was reenacted in 1872, CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.1; amended three
times: 1889 Cal. Stat. 223, ch. 191, § 1; 1897 Cal. Stat. 201, ch. 139, § 1; 1913 Cal. Stat. 212,
ch. 122, § 1; and recodified: 1970 Cal. Stat. 2406, ch. 1301, § 2.
3. Section 261.5 provides: "Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female ig under the
age of 18 years."
4. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17 & 121-22.
5. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340
(1979), aft'd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
6. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. 25 Cal. 3d 608, 611, 601 P.2d 572, 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (1979), aft'd, 450 U.S.
464 (1981).
9. Id at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343. The court sustained the constitu-
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Superior Court, 10 the United States Supreme Court, in a plurality
opinion," affirmed the decision of the state supreme court.
This note questions whether historical evidence and legal prece-
dent support the Court's acceptance of pregnancy prevention as the ac-
tual purpose of section 261.5. It concludes that the currently
articulated purpose was invoked by the State as an after-the-fact ra-
tionalization to justify a statute that was not in fact enacted with this
purpose in view.
This note suggests that: (1) The California Supreme Court inap-
propriately failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the actual pur-
pose of section 261.5, as distinct from the ostensible purpose, and that
the United States Supreme Court similarly failed to conduct its own
independent examination of this issue; (2) the Supreme Court failed to
require the State to make a persuasive showing that the discriminatory
classification substantially deters teenage pregnancy; (3) the Court
overlooked the more subtle discriminatory effects of section 261.5 on
both males and females; and (4) by focusing on the desirability of
preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancy, the Court ignored crucial
components of the appropriate equal protection standard established to
review challenges to gender-based laws. This note concludes that in so
doing, the Court not only reached an untenable result, but, at the same
time, greatly weakened the test for ascertaining the constitutionality of
gender-based classifications ostensibly aimed at males.
Finally, this note discusses the ramifications of Michael M. with
respect to the future of section 261.5. All state gender-based statutory
rape laws have been adopted by legislative action; no state court has
overturned a gender-based statutory rape law.' 2 This note suggests that
the decision of the California Supreme Court in this case forecloses the
possibility of such action by the judiciary, with but two exceptions.
First, the passage of an equal rights amendment would provide the ju-
diciary with explicit constitutional authority for stringent review of
tionality of § 261.5 by a narrow majority. The opinion was written by Justice Richardson.
Chief Justice Bird and Justices Clark and Manuel concurred. Justice Mosk filed a dissenting
opinion, joined by Justices Tobriner and Newman.
10. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell joined.
Justices Stewart and Blackmun filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justices White and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens wrote a
separate dissenting opinion.
11. In this note any reference to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Michael
M. will refer to the plurality opinion.
12. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 614-15, 601 P.2d 572, 576, 159
Cal. Rptr. 340, 344, aft'd, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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gender classifications.13 Second, a challenge to the statute in a case
presenting either evidence of female culpability or of the absence of
force or coercion on the part of a minor male defendant might sur-
mount the constitutional hurdle established in Michael M. This note
concludes with the observation that, at present, legislative action is the
only effective process for a change in the gender-based status of section
261.5.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Late one evening in 1978, two teenagers met at a bus stop in
Northern California. Sharon, age sixteen and a half, and her twenty-
one-year old sister were waiting for the bus and drinking whiskey when
Michael, age seventeen and a half, and two other boys stopped and
offered to share some wine with the girls. The group drifted off to-
gether, drinking and talking. Soon Michael and Sharon separated
from the others and engaged in a private romantic interlude in nearby
bushes. At one point Sharon resisted Michael's attentions, but he con-
tinued to kiss her without further resistance on her part. They were
interrupted by Sharon's sister who asked Sharon if she was ready to
leave. Sharon replied that she was not and switched her amorous at-
tentions to another boy.
Sometime later, after the others had departed, Sharon and Michael
went to a nearby park and resumed their sexual activities on a park
bench. When Sharon refused to have intercourse with Michael he
struck her several times, and she consented. Afterwards, Michael left
Sharon in the park.'4 A neighbor found her and notified the police.' 5
Michael M. was subsequently arrested and charged with a felony
violation of section 261.5.16 In his petition prior to trial, he challenged
the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it unlawfully dis-
13. State and federal equal rights amendments are based on the principle that the law
cannot discriminate on the basis of sex: Any differential treatment must rest upon the par-
ticular characteristics of the individuals affected or characteristics unique to one sex. If, how-
ever, a state attempted to justify a discriminatory law by employing the unique physical
differences rationale, an equal rights amendment would authorize strict scrutiny of the stat-
ute. In theory, a court would require that the challenged law be necessary to the achieve-
ment of a compelling state interest. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871,
893-96 (1971); see also infra note 231 and accompanying text.
14. Telephone interview with Gregory Jilka, petitioner's attorney (August 9, 1981).
15. Id Sharon testified to all the other facts at a preliminary hearing. Joint Appendix
at 16-37, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
16. 25 Cal. 3d 608, 610, 601 P.2d 572, 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (1979), affid, 450 U.S.
464 (1981). This pseudonym was adopted pursuant to California's policy of protecting the
1983]
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criminated on the basis of gender. 7 Although he conceded that the
state had a compelling interest in preventing pregnancy in unwed teen-
age females, he contended that the actual purpose of the statute was to
protect the virtue of young females. As such, he argued, the statute was
invalid because it rested on archaic stereotypes.18 Moreover, he con-
tended that the statute was impermissibly overinclusive because it pro-
hibited intercourse among persons incapable of procreation or those
who employed birth control.' 9 He also contended that the statute was
impermissibly underinclusive because it ignored any degree of female
responsibility for the sexual act. Finally, he urged that the state's inter-
est in pregnancy prevention could be as well served by a gender-neutral
statute as by a gender-based statute.2 0
III. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
In Michael M. v. Superior Court,2' the California Supreme Court
began its analysis by observing that California law regards gender as a
suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the State
had the burden of establishing both a compelling interest that would
justify the law and that the classification was necessary to further the
statute's purpose.22 The State asserted that section 261.5 was enacted to
reduce the incidence of pregnancy in unwed minor females and intro-
duced an impressive body of statistical data to demonstrate the severity
of the problem.23
The supreme court accepted at face value the State's articulation
of the purpose of the statute and declared that the admittedly discrimi-
natory classification was "readily justified" by this important objec-
tive.24 The court reasoned that because only females become pregnant,
and only males can cause the result which the law properly seeks to
avoid, a classification based on gender is necessary to identify victim
identity of minors. See R. FORMICHI, CALIFORNIA STYLE MANUAL §§ 213-14, 24546 (2d
rev. ed. 1977).
17. 450 U.S. at 467.
18. Id at 472 n.7.
19. Id at 475.
20. Id at 473.
21. 25 Cal. 3d 608, 610, 601 P.2d 572, 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (1979), aftd, 450 U.S.
464 (1981).
22. Id at 610, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
23. Id at 611-12, 601 P.2d at 574-75, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43. The court equated a
number of evils with unwed teenage pregnancies, including the fact that most such
pregnancies are unwanted, births to teenage mothers pose substantially increased medical
risks, and most teenage mothers never complete high school. Id
24. Id at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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and offender.25
The court rejected the petitioner's contention that section 261.5 is
both impermissibly over and underinclusive. The court observed that
the legislature could properly include within the ambit of the statute
even those persons who, as female victims or male offenders, employ
birth control devices or techniques and those persons otherwise incapa-
ble of procreation. 6 The court stated:
We doubt that legislators, intent on use of the criminal law to
prevent juvenile pregnancies, would throw such a roadblock
in the way of effective prosecution as would be created by
subjecting an under-age prosecutrix to cross-examination of
such additionally embarrassing and uncertain details. Fur-
thermore, we believe legislators' rejection of the defenses sug-
gested . . . reflect[s] their reluctance to rely, for
accomplishment of their anti-pregnancy objective, upon the
doubtful efficacy of contraceptives and the truth of the inevi-
table claim of non-emission by a male charged with statutory
rape.27
The court similarly rejected the argument that the statute must be
broadened to hold the female equally culpable. Females, the court rea-
soned, are vulnerable to greater risks and adverse consequences of
pregnancy; thus, the differing degrees of culpability are justified. In
addition, the court stated that the inclusion of females would effectively
eliminate any possibility of prosecution because if females were subject
to prosecution they would be unlikely to report violations of the statute.
Furthermore, the statute was enacted to protect, not penalize, young
females.2 8 The court noted that section 261.5 is only one part of a
wider statutory scheme that protects all minors from sexual abuse; the
statute merely provides additional protection for minor females in rec-
ognition of the demonstrably greater injury, physical and emotional,
that they may suffer.29
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
With few modifications, the United States Supreme Court substan-
tially adopted the analysis of the state court in its review of MichaelM
25. Id at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
26. Id at 612-13, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
27. Id. at 613, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (quoting State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d
815, 821 n.18 (Me. 1978)).
28. 25 Cal. 3d at 613-14, 601 P.2d at 575-76, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
29. Id at 613, 601 P.2d at 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
1983]
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v. Superior Court. 3 o The Court observed that, in contrast to the Cali-
fornia court, it has not treated gender-based classifications as inher-
ently suspect, hence deserving of strict judicial scrutiny, but that it has
required such classifications to bear a "substantial relationship" to "im-
portant governmental objectives."''1 The Court found the purpose un-
derlying section 261.5 to be less than clear, but chose to defer to the
California court's acceptance of the purpose asserted by the State. The
Court concluded that at least one of the purposes of the statute was the
prevention of illegitimate teenage pregnancy.3 2 The Court also con-
cluded that the State demonstrated a strong interest in preventing such
pregnancies in light of its showing that such pregnancies constituted a
serious social problem.33
The fundamental issue of the case, the Court stated, was "whether
a State may attack the problem of sexual intercourse and teenage preg-
nancy directly by prohibiting a male from having sexual intercourse
with a minor female. ' 34 The Court reasoned that males and females
are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and risks of sex-
ual intercourse because virtually all the adverse consequences befall the
female .3  The Court found it reasonable for the California Legislature
to exclude females from punishment because the risk of pregnancy
serves as a natural deterrent to young females, while no similar deter-
rent exists for males. A criminal sanction imposed on the male thus
operates roughly to "equalize" the deterrents on the sexes. 6
The Court rejected as irrelevant petitioner's argument that a gen-
der-neutral statute might serve the state's goal as well as section 261.5.
The relevant issue, the Court insisted, was not whether the statute was
drafted as precisely as it might have been, but whether its provisions
were within constitutional limits. 37 Furthermore, the Court found per-
suasive the State's contention that the inclusion of females might effec-
tively frustrate its interest in statutory enforcement.38
The Court also rejected as "ludicrous" petitioner's contention that
the statute was impermissibly overbroad because it prohibited inter-
course with females too young to conceive, and found the age of the
30. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
31. Id at 469.
32. Id at 469-70.
33. Id at 470-71.
34. Id at 472 (footnote omitted).
35. Id at 471.
36. Id at 473.
37. Id
38. Id at 473-74.
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male irrelevant because young men are as capable as older men of in-
flicting pregnancy on females.39 The Court concluded that section
261.5 does not discriminate against females, and that even though the
discriminatory rule burdens males, the latter are in no need of the spe-
cial solicitude of the courts.4°
V. EQUAL PROTECTION AND GENDER-BASED
STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
A. The Standard of Review
In Michael M., petitioner invoked the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment4 1 as a bar to his prosecution for statutory
rape. Constitutional challenges to gender-based statutory rape laws
have been based, for the most part, on alleged violations of this
clause.42 Traditionally, the Court required only a rational relationship
between discriminatory classifications and permissible state objec-
tives. 43 Where the purpose of a statute was not clearly stated by the
legislature, the Court accepted without further inquiry the assertions of
those currently defending the law, or the Court itself suggested hypo-
thetical legislative goals.44 Any real or hypothetical goal grounded in
the public interest was held constitutionally permissible, and the Court
exhibited extreme deference to the legislative definition of the public
interest "either out of judicial sympathy for the difficulties of the legis-
lative process or out of a belief in judicial restraint generally."'4 Prior
to 1977, courts routinely invoked the rational relationship test to review
39. Id at 475.
40. Id at 475-76.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
42. Discriminatory federal statutes are challenged as violative of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 & n.2 (1975).
43. See, eg., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ('The equal
protection clause... does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of
police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely
arbitrary.").
44. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961) (upholding Maryland
statute requiring closing of certain businesses on Sundays; suggesting that although such
laws had genesis in religion, present permissible legislative goal could be desire to set aside
Sunday as secular day of rest for enhancement of public welfare); Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552,563 (1947) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring appren-
ticeship as prerequisite to harbor pilot licensing even though apprentices selected by rela-
tives and friends; hypothesizing that "the benefits to morale and esprit de corps which family
and neighborly tradition might contribute. . . might have prompted the legislature to per-
mit Louisiana pilot officers to select those with whom they would serve").
45. L. TRIBn, AMERicAN CoNsTrrrnoNAL LAW § 16-2, at 995 (1978).
1983]
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the constitutionality of gender-based statutory rape laws.46 Opinions
reflected the judicial deference characteristic of this test and, not sur-
prisingly, these statutes were upheld as rationally related to permissible
governmental objectives.47
Conversely, the Court has devised a strict scrutiny test to review
classifications based on suspect criteria.48 Under the strict scrutiny test
the Court has not deferred to legislative judgment but has determined
itself if the classification was necessary to the achievement of a compel-
ling state interest and if the stated interest was the actual purpose of the
law.
4 9
46. But see Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977) (equal protection chal-
lenge to New Hampshire's gender-based statutory rape law reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny test), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978). For a more detailed discussion of this case
see infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
47. Because the United States Supreme Court had not reviewed an equal protection
challenge to a statutory rape law before Michael M, it is necessary to examine state and
lower federal court decisions for the analysis applied to such challenges. Two cases are
illustrative.
In Flores v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 509, 230 N.W.2d 637 (1975), petitioner challenged Wis-
consin's gender-based statutory rape law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that gender-
based classifications were to be reviewed under the rational relationship test, rather than the
strict scrutiny test, and suggested two possible purposes underlying this gender-based classi-
fication: (1) the prevention of pregnancy in minor females and (2) the protection of such
females from sexual exploitation. The court determined that these hypothetical goals ade-
quately justified the classification. Id at 510-11, 230 N.W.2d at 638. The court did not
consider the vulnerability of minor males to exploitation, nor how the exclusion of minor
females from the statutory proscription advanced the goal of pregnancy prevention.
In Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976), the defendant was convicted of
violating a West Virginia statutory rape law for engaging in consensual sexual intercourse
with a thirteen-year-old girl. The Fourth Circuit stated that when compared to their male
peers, thirteen-year-old females were more vulnerable to physical injury from sexual inter-
course, and that males might cause such females to become pregnant. Thus, the court deter-
mined that there was a rational basis for treating intercourse between males and thirteen-
year-old females as a separate and distinct crime. Id at 1235. The Hall court did not ex-
amine how the statutory exclusion of females served to prevent pregnancy; neither did it
explain how the slight incidence of pregnancy in thirteen-year-old girls served to justify this
rationale.
48. To term a legislative classification "suspect" suggests that it may have resulted from
prejudice against the group it burdens. In Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
the Court held that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial an-
tagonism never can." Id at 216.
Certain classifications based on alienage have also been deemed suspect. Because
aliens cannot vote, they are a politically powerless minority and have often suffered eco-
nomic and social disadvantage. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
49. See Clark, Legislatipe Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953 (1978). "[H]istory demonstrates that legislatures have repeatedly
treated suspect classes. . . not only arbitrarily but frequently with animus, or in a way that
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Traditionally, gender classifications have not received strict scru-
tiny; however, section 261.5 presents a powerful illustration for the ar-
gument that gender classifications should be deemed suspect. The
statute implicitly classifies women as weak, passive victims incapable of
intelligent decisions about their sexuality,5" and it implicitly equates
maleness with aggressiveness. 5' A majority of the Court, however, has
never invoked the strict scrutiny standard in its review of classifications
based on sex.52
denies the equal moral worth of the individuals concerned.. .. This suspicion of legislative
bias [has justified] the anti-democratic intervention of the Supreme Court into the law-mak-
ing process." Id at 954.
Furthermore, the Court has not tolerated approximations. The party defending the
statute has had the burden of proving that it is so narrowly drawn that it furthers only the
legitimate interests at stake and that it embodies the least discriminatory alternative avail-
able for achieving the state's purpose. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (in-
validating Florida criminal statute which prohibited cohabitation of unwed interracial
couples) for a full discussion of the principles underlying strict scrutiny.
50. MichaelM, 25 Cal. 3d at 623-25, 601 P.2d at 582-83, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
51. See MichaelM, 450 U.S. at 500-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (statute reflects legisla-
tive judgment that males are aggressors).
52. Classifications that discriminate on the basis of gender are analogous to those that
discriminate on the basis of race. Color and sex are unchangeable, readily observable, and
easily stereotyped characteristics long associated with discriminatory assumptions which are
usually unrelated to any innate individual differences. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (New York statute favoring unwed mothers over unwed
fathers as adoptive parents held unconstitutional).
However, only four members of the Court have ever recognized the "long and unfortu-
nate history of sex discrimination" in the United States as a justification for deeming classifi-
cations based on sex inherently suspect. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)
(invalidating federal statutory scheme that automatically granted dependents' benefits to
wives of armed services personnel but forced husbands to prove dependent status).
The political status of the lapsed equal rights amendment served as a primary justifica-
tion for the different standards of review accorded race and gender. On several occasions,
particular justices demonstrated their reluctance to apply strict scrutiny while a proposal for
such a major constitutional amendment was pending. In Frontiero, Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, stated that he felt compelled to withhold strict
scrutiny of gender classifications until passage of the equal rights amendment. Id at 692
(Powell, J., concurring):
The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of
this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratifi-
cation by the States. . . . [D]emocratic institutions are weakened, and confidence
in the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear unnecessarily to decide
sensitive issues of broad social and political importance at the very time they are
under consideration within the prescribed constitutional processes.
In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating law forbidding sale of 3.2% beer to
males under 21 but permitting such sale to females over 18), Chief Justice Burger reiterated
his position in Frontiero and stated that "[w]ithout an independent constitutional basis sup-
porting the right asserted or disfavoring the classification adopted, I can justify no substan-
tive constitutional protection other than the. . .[minimal] protection afforded by the. ..
[rational relationship test]." Id at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In 1976, the Court articulated the intermediate scrutiny test it was
to invoke in its review of Michael M 53 In Craig v. Boren,54 the Court
held that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."55 As the label implies, the intermediate scrutiny test de-
notes a standard midway between the rational relationship test and the
strict scrutiny test.
The Court explained in Craig why a heightened level of review is
appropriate for gender-based classifications:
In light of the weak congruence between gender and the char-
acteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, it was
necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their
substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt pro-
cedures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered
generalization actually comported with fact. 6
Three years after Craig, in Caban v. Mohammed, -7 Justice Stewart
noted that gender classifications "are in many settings invidious be-
cause they relegate a person to the place set aside for the group on the
basis of an attribute that the person cannot change."5" The Court has
continued to hold gender classifications invidiously discriminatory
when based on no greater justification than assumptions regarding the
innate capabilities of the sexes, stereotypes of the proper roles for men
and women or assumptions regarding inferior social status.59 Further-
53. The Court had set the stage for the new level of review it was to apply to gender-
based classifications four years earlier in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Reed opin-
ion invalidated an Idaho law which preferred male over female relatives as administrators of
decedents' estates. Id at 74. Under the rational relationship test, the elimination of one
class of claimants would have served a legitimate goal by reducing the workload of the
probate courts, but the Court found the mandatory preference for males arbitrary and held
that "the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex." Id
at 77.
Although the language of the case is cast in rational relationship terms, "[o]nly by im-
porting some special suspicion of sex-related means from [a] new equal protection area can
the result be made entirely persuasive." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword-
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: .4 Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1972).
54. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
55. Id at 197.
56. Id at 199.
57. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
58. Id at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating provision of
Social Security Act granting survivors' benefits to widows with children while denying such
benefits to widowers with children). "Mhe notion that men are more likely than women to
be the primary supporters of their [families].. .is not.. . without support. . . .But such a
[Vol. 16
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more, the Court has expressly held that classifications that discriminate
against males, as well as those that discriminate against females, are
subject to intermediate scrutiny.60
Application of the intermediate scrutiny test to a law that discrimi-
nated against males is illustrated by Craig itself. At issue in Craig was
an Oklahoma statute which provided criminal penalties for the sale of
beer with an alcoholic content of 3.2% to males under age twenty-one
and females under age eighteen. The Court accepted, for purposes of
discussion, the district court's identification of traffic safety as the pur-
pose of the legislation, but found the statistical evidence offered inade-
quate to support a conclusion that the classification closely served to
advance that goal. 61 The Court deemed the connection between traffic
safety and gender too tenuous.62 The studies introduced by the State
documented an increase in drunk driving both in and out of the state,63
gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women
who do work and [who]. . .contribute significantly to their families' support." Id at 645;
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). The Stanton Court held that a Utah statute, which
decreed that males reached majority at 21 and females at 18, and which also provided that
upon divorce the parents of the female became responsible for their daughter's support until
she reached the age of 18, while the parents of males had to support their sons until they
reached 21 could not survive equal protection attack under any test.
No longer is the female destined solely for the house and the rearing of the
family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.. . .If a
specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental
support while he attains his education and training, so, too, is it for the girl. ....
[]f the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be ex-
pected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end
earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.
Id. at 14-15; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973): "[S]ex. . .is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth. . . . [It] frequently bears no rela-
tion to ability to perform or contribute to society." (footnote omitted).
60. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); accord Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
61. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 199-200, 204. One survey established that 16.5% of men
had been drinking within two hours of driving while 11.4% of women had been drinking.
Similarly, 14.6% of males exceeded the legal blood alcohol concentration level while 11.47%
of women exceeded the level. Id. at 203 & n.16. In 1973, 0.18% of the females aged 18 to 20
were arrested in Oklahoma for driving under the influence of alcohol compared to 2% of the
males in the same age group. Id. at 201. Figures for all ages indicated that male arrests for
alcohol-related offenses increased with age. Id. at 200 n.8. The Court determined that these
statistics did not justify the employment of gender as a classifying device. Id. at 201.
The Court found that no survey measured the use and dangerousness of 3.2% beer as
compared to alcohol generally, a significant detail because Oklahoma considered 3.2% beer
non-intoxicating, and no findings were related to the sex-age differentials at issue. .d. at
203. Moreover, because the statute only prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to young males, not
its consumption, the Court held that the classification did not substantially advance the goal
of traffic safety. Id. at 204.
62. Id. at 202, 204.
63. Id. at 200-01.
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but the State failed to demonstrate that the statutory scheme served as a
deterrent to such behavior in Oklahoma. In fact, the disproportion-
ately high arrest statistics for young males indicated that the statutory
scheme was a futile means of controlling driving behavior.
64
Because every law must be based on a constitutionally permissible
objective, and because the reasonableness of a classification depends on
the degree to which it advances that objective, the first step in any
equal protection analysis is to determine the purpose of the challenged
statute.61 Under the intermediate scrutiny test applied to gender-based
classifications, the Court has insisted on proof of a law's actual pur-
pose, as illuminated by its language, structure, legislative history, and
operative effect. Accordingly, the Court has rejected "after-the-fact ra-
tionalizations" asserted to justify a law that was not in fact adopted
with the asserted purpose in mind, regardless of the justifiability of the
currently asserted purpose.
61
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,67 the Court held that a legislature
may "provide for the special problems of women, ' ' 68 but the "mere rec-
itation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
64. Id. at 202 n. 14: "[T]he disproportionately high arrest statistics for young males-
and, indeed, the growing alcohol-related arrest figures for all ages and sexes-simply may be
taken to document the relative futility of controlling driving behavior by the 3.2% beer stat-
ute. .. "
65. Tussman & tenBroek, The EqualProtection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV., 341, 344-
47 (1949).
66. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating
school district's mandatory maternity leave policies). In a concurring opinion Justice Powell
observed that although the stated objectives of the challenged policies (teacher absenteeism,
classroom discipline, the safety of students, pregnant teachers, and their unborn children)
were no doubt legitimate concerns, they were unsupported, after-the-fact rationalizations.
Rather, the record strongly indicated that the policies were adopted to keep obviously preg-
nant teachers from students' view. Id. at 653 (Powell, J., concurring).
One commentator notes that when a rule is defended with a consideration that did not,
in fact, contribute to its enactment, the rule should be invalidated under the intermediate
scrutiny test. L. TRIBE, supra note 45, § 16-30, at 1086.
[I]t seems sound to resist upholding a significant deprivation of liberty or a sub-
stantial discrimination on a basis that did not occur to those responsible for the
injury .... [S]uch resistance deprives the enacting body of nothing it deliberately
. . . sought but only of the windfall it would receive if the product of its work were
to survive for reasons that played no proper role . . . in the enacting process.
Moreover, if the only reason a rule is struck down is that its justification has been
conceived only after the fact, re-enactment for the proper reason remains a possi-
bility. And from the perspective of the individual adversely affected by the results
of a lawmaking process, justice requires at least some sensitivity to whether the
process that produced a challenged rule was itself an example of the very evil to be
avoided.. . rather than a considered effort to overcome that evil ....
Id. at 1086-87 (footnotes omitted).
67. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
68. Id. at 653.
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which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying
a statutory scheme."6 9 The Court scrutinized both the language and
legislative history of the challenged statute and found it apparent that
Congress' objective in providing Social Security benefits to widows
with young children was not to compensate women who were, because
of economic discrimination, unable to provide for themselves. Rather,
it was clear that Congress intended to permit mothers to choose not to
work so as to care for their children.70
If, as in Craig, the express language of a statute is not indicative of
its purpose and the legislative history does not clarify the statute's
objectives, the Court has analyzed the relationship between the cur-
rently asserted purposes and the gender-based classification.71 Where
69. Id. at 648 (footnote omitted).
70. Id. at 648-49.
Compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking down provision of Social
Security Act which granted survivors' benefits to widows regardless of prior dependency but
which granted such benefits to widowers only if they could prove they had been dependent
on deceased wives for at least half of their support) with Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977) (per curiam) (upholding provision of Social Security Act which provided for discrimi-
natory benefits computation scheme favoring female wage earners).
In Goldfarb, the Government argued that the challenged statute reflected a valid con-
gressional assumption that widowers were less likely to be dependent on spouses than wid-
ows and that Congress deliberately intended to remedy the greater needs of the latter. 430
U.S. at 207, 216-17. The Court conducted a full inquiry into the actual purposes of the
statute to resolve these issues and found that, regardless of a couple's actual income or stan-
dard of living, the express terms of the statute granted benefits automatically to widows and
to any widower who could prove he had been dependent on his wife for more than half of
his support. Id. at 213. The Court also found that the general statutory scheme, of which
the challenged provision was a part, showed that dependence, not need, was the crucial
factor in determining the categories of beneficiaries. Id. at 213-14.
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the statute and found no congressional
intent to remedy the effects of prior discrimination on nondependent widows. Id. at 216. In
fact, there was every indication that the statute was based on the stereotyped presumption
that men are responsible for the support of their families, id. at 215, which, as the Court had
previously held in Wiesenfeld, denigrated the efforts of working women who supported their
families. The Court also found that when the challenged provision was enacted, Congress
assumed it to be the equivalent of a provision for benefits to widows under a previous statute
which itself had been enacted to equalize the protection given to dependents of both sexes,
rather than to benefit nondependent wives. Id. at 216.
In Webster, the petitioner asserted that the discriminatory scheme at issue was irra-
tional. The Court again conducted a full inquiry into the actual purpose of the statute and
found that because its terms expressly provided that retirement benefits were to be based on
past earnings, the statute operated directly to compensate women for past economic discrim-
ination. 430 U.S. at 318. The Court also examined the legislative history of the provision
and found, in contrast to Goldfarb, that Congress had directly addressed the justification for
differing treatment of the sexes and "purposely enacted the more favorable treatment for
female wage earners to compensate for past employment discrimination against women."
Id.
71. See, e.g., 429 U.S. at 199-200 & n.7.
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it has found the relationship to be "unduly tenuous," the Court has
concluded either that the asserted purpose could not have been the ac-
tual legislative goal or that the classification was unreasonable and
therefore invalid.72 Furthermore, where the Court has found that the
highest court of a state merely accepted at face value questionable as-
sertions of legislative purpose, the Court has not deferred to the state
court but, instead, has instituted its own inquiry de novo.,
72. See, e.g., id at 202, 204. In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), Justice Ste-
vens discussed the hypothetical justifications suggested for the classification. He noted that
although only 10% of the women were nondependent and that the statute expedited the
processing of the applications of the remaining 90% (dependent wives), the offsetting cost
imposed on the nation in order to achieve this administrative convenience was staggering:
automatic payment made to the remaining 10% totaled $750 million a year. He was, there-
fore, convinced that administrative convenience could not have been the actual reason for
the discrimination. Id. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., concurring).
He also argued that the disparate treatment of widows and widowers was not a product
of a conscious purpose to redress past economic discrimination against women because only
nondependent widows benefited from the disparate treatment. He stated that "[r]espect for
the legislative process precludes the assumption that the statutory discrimination is the prod-
uct of such irrational lawmaking." Id. at 221. He concluded that a statute which effected an
unequal distribution of economic benefits on the basis of sex alone was sufficiently question-
able because "'due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the
rule was actually intended to serve [the] interest" asserted by the Government. Id. at 223
(citations omitted).
73. Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (affirming judgment of California
Supreme Court that an amendment to California Constitution permitting owners of prop-
erty to dispose of their holdings as they chose unconstitutionally involved state in racial
discrimination in housing market) with Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating
Massachusetts statutory scheme which made it more difficult for single, then married, per-
sons to obtain contraceptives).
In Reitman, the Court held that the California Supreme Court "quite properly under-
took to examine the constitutionality of [the amendment] in terms of its 'immediate objec-
tive,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and the conditions existing prior to its
enactment.'" 387 U.S. at 373 (citations omitted). The Court stated that the finding of the
state court was especially worthy of its consideration. Id. at 374. Because the amendment
had been challenged within months of its passage, there were no prior decisions reflecting
the view of the state court concerning the purpose, scope, and operative effect of the amend-
ment that conflicted with the present finding. See id. at 372-73. In the absence of a sound
rebuttal by the parties defending the amendment, the Court found no reason for rejecting
the judgment of the California Supreme Court. Id. at 38 1.
Prior to the decision in Baird, the Masschusetts Supreme Court had determined that the
purposes of the challenged statutory scheme were to protect both the health and morals of
state citizens by deterring premarital sex. The Baird Court, however, stated that the actual
statutory purposes remained unclear. 405 U.S. at 442, 448. As for the morals justification,
the Court found it unreasonable to assume that by proscribing the sale of contraceptives to
unwed citizens, the state had "prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as
punishment for fornication." Id. at 448.
Furthermore, contraceptives that were to be used for the prevention of disease were not
statutorily proscribed; contraceptives had to be obtained from physicians and pharmacists,
and federal and state laws already regulated the distribution of harmful drugs. Thus, health
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In addition to identifying the purpose of the law, the Court, since
Craig, has required that gender classifications closely serve the
achievement of important governmental interests.74 In this area, the
Court has exhibited less tolerance for overinclusiveness recognizing
that while the majority might properly belong within the class, "a gen-
der-based classification need not ring false to work a discrimination
that in the individual case might be invidious."" Furthermore, where
the state's interest could have been as well served by a gender-neutral
statute as by one that discriminates on the basis of sex, the Court has
held the latter constitutionally impermissible.76 Finally, under the in-
termediate scrutiny test, the Court has required the Government, rather
than the party challenging the statute, to prove by an exceedingly per-
suasive demonstration that the gender classification substantially ad-
could "no more reasonably be regarded as [a statutory] purpose than the deterrence of pre-
marital sexual relations." Id. at 448-52. The Court concluded that the only possible justifi-
cation for the statutory scheme was a per se prohibition on the use of contraceptives as
immoral and held that because the distribution of contraceptives to married persons could
not be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons was equally impermissible.
Id. at 452-53.
74. See, e.g., 429 U.S. at 200 (1976).
75. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting on ground that
sexes not similarly situated in area covered by challenged statute).
In Caban, a father of illegitimate children challenged a New York statute that permit-
ted only mothers to block adoption of their illegitimate children by withholding consent.
The New York Court of Appeals had found that if the consent of unmarried fathers were
required, adoption of their children could be severely hindered: Such fathers were often
impossible to locate when adoption proceedings were brought, whereas mothers were more
likely to remain with their children. Id. at 392.
The Court determined that the classification was impermissibly overinclusive, however,
and held that even if the state high court were "correct that unmarried fathers often desert
their families,. . . then allowing those fathers who remain[ed] with their families a right to
object to the termination of their parental rights [would] pose little threat to the State's abil-
ity to order adoption in most cases." Id. at 392-93 n.13.
76. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), where the Court found that Alabama's
challenged alimony scheme could not be upheld on the basis of the state's preference for
allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife was presumed dependent and the
husband was presumed liable for her support. Because the scheme also provided for indi-
vidualized hearings where the parties' relative financial circumstances were considered,
there was no justification for a presumption of dependency and responsibility based on gen-
der. Id. at 281-82. The Court held that where a "State's compensatory and ameliorative
purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies
and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted
to classify on the basis of sex." Id. at 283; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). In
Caban, the Court noted "alternatives to the gender-based distinction of [New York's adop-
tion statute] . . . to emphasize that the state interests asserted in support of the statutory
classification could be protected through . . . mechanisms more closely attuned to those
interests." Id. at 393 n.13.
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vances the purpose of the statute. 7
B. The Standard of Review Applied to Gender-Based
Statutory Rape Laws
Federal circuit courts reviewing challenges to gender-based statu-
tory rape laws in the interim between Craig and Michael M have ap-
plied the intermediate scrutiny test. In Meloon v. Helgemoe,78 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a New Hampshire law that penal-
ized any male who engaged in intercourse with a female under age
fifteen. The State asserted that the purposes of the statute were to pro-
tect children from the exploitation associated with intercourse and, in
particular, to prevent physical injury and pregnancy in young females.
The State justified the classification on the grounds that females are
more likely than males to be victimized; they are more vulnerable than
males to physical injury; and only females become pregnant.7 9 Con-
versely, the State contended that because most males under fifteen are
incapable of intercourse, they could not be victimized and that since
pedophilia 0 is more common in males, there are potentially more male
77. In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 445 (1981), a Louisiana statute providing a hus-
band, as "head and master" of property jointly owned with his wife, the unilateral right to
dispose of such property without his wife's consent was held to violate the equal protection
clause. .d. at 456. The Court stated that "the burden remains on the party seeking to up-
hold a statute that expressly discriminates on the basis of sex to advance an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for the challenged classification." Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
In Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), a provision of the Missouri
workers' compensation statute that automatically granted work-related death benefits to
widows, but which required widowers to provc dependence on their wives' earnings was
found unconstitutional on the ground that it impermissibly discriminated against both work-
ing wives and widowers of deceased workers. The Court held:
The burden. . . is on those defending the discrimination to make out the claimed
justification, and this burden is not carried simply by noting that in 1925 the state
legislature thought widows to be more in need of prompt help than men or that
today "the substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and
women justifies the advantage" given to widows. . . . It may be that there is em-
pirical support for the proposition that men are more likely to be the principal
supporters of their spouses and families, . . . but the bare assertion of this argu-
ment falls far short of justifying gender-based discrimination on the grounds of
administrative convenience. Yet neither the [Missouri Supreme Court] nor appel-
lees in this Court essay any persuasive demonstration as to what the economic
consequences to the State or to the beneficiaries might be if, in one way or another,
men and women, whether as wage earners or survivors, were treated equally under
the workers' compensation law, thus eliminating the double-edged discrimination
described in. . . this opinion.
Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted).
78. 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1977).
79. Id. at 605-06.
80. Pedophilia is a sexual condition in which children are the preferred sexual object.
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than female offenders.8 '
The Meloon court found the statute to be impermissibly underin-
clusive. Because the statute defined intercourse as any sexual contact
involving the slightest vaginal penetration, and adult females could co-
erce or force prepubescent boys to perform such an act, young boys
were subject to victimization but were denied statutory protection.
Moreover, because the State offered no evidence of the incidence of
pedophilia in males, or of the percentage of pedophiles who violated
the statute, its justification for penalizing only males was unfounded.82
The court refused to accept the pregnancy prevention rationale in
the absence of any evidence to support it. The court reasoned that the
provisions of the statute, in fact, reflected a contrary conclusion: The
age of consent was set at fifteen and thus the preponderance of the class
consisted of prepubescent females; no proof of seminal emission was
required; and no birth control defense was permitted. Furthermore,
the court warned that because pregnancy was a condition unique to
females, its very uniqueness made it a convenient hindsight rationale
for laws actually enacted for different reasons.8 3
The court found the physical injury rationale imprecise and over-
inclusive: Because the statute protected all females under age fifteen, it
included consenting females who were not prone to injury. 84 More-
over, the State offered no showing of how often genital injury occurred
"even for the adult-child scenario, particularly in light of the 'penetra-
tion, however slight' definition of the offense." 85 The court concluded
that it could not find a substantial connection between "(1) the fact that
one subclass of one gender class of victims has some indeterminate
likelihood of suffering an additional injury to which the other gender
class is not susceptible, and (2) the state's statutory scheme which pe-
nalizes only one gender exclusively and protects the other gender
exclusively."86
Conversely, in Rundlett v. Oliver,87 the same court upheld a Maine
law that punished males who engaged in intercourse with females
under age fourteen. The court determined that of the two asserted stat-
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1665
(1966).
81. 564 F.2d at 605-06.
82. Id. at 606-07.
83. Id. at 607-08 & n.6.
84. Id. at 608.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1979).
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utory purposes, the prevention of physical injury and pregnancy in
young females, the former was supported by the legislative history of
an antecedent statute and by prior judicial interpretation of the existing
statute.88 Furthermore, the State offered substantial evidence to sup-
port its assertion that females under age fourteen, unlike their male
peers, are often the victims of physical injury caused by males. The
court held that the State had met its burden of proving that the classifi-
cation closely served the achievement of an actual and important gov-
ernmental objective. Thus, the court concluded that it was not
necessary to examine the purported relationship between the classifica-
tion and the pregnancy prevention rationale.89
A consistent application of the intermediate scrutiny test enabled
the First Circuit to uphold the statute in Rundlett and strike down that
in Meloon. The court explained that because the statute under attack
in Rundlett set the age of female victims lower than the statute chal-
lenged in Meloon, the former statute provided "greater congruity be-
tween'the class of victims and the potential risk of injury to them that is
sought to be prevented."90 Thus, the court determined that the classifi-
cation embodied in the Maine law was substantially related to the law's
purpose. Conversely, in Meloon, the New Hampshire classification
"covered a far larger class of female victims than the injury prevention
justification would warrant." 91 Accordingly, it was not substantially re-
lated to the statute's asserted purpose.
In United States v. Hicks,92 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
88. Id. at 500-02. As the dissent pointed out, however, Maine's Supreme Judicial Court
relied on the legislative history of a Massachusetts statutory rape law, and no evidence was
offered to show that when the Maine Legislature copied it 200 years later any particular
objective was considered. Id. at 505-06 (Bownes, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 502-03. Moreover, in Jlundlet, the First Circuit underlined its holding in
Meloon by noting:
[W]e remain in doubt as to the acceptability of justifying a gender-based classifica-
tion on the basis of a pregnancy prevention rationale. We would find that justifica-
tion particularly troubling in the case at bar. First, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court's conclusions of legislative history on this point need not be accorded the
same degree of deference we have given. .. [to the prevention of physical injury
rationale], since that court's fashioning of the pregnancy prevention purpose was
based, not on language found in the statute itself or its antecedents, but upon after-
the-fact inferences drawn from failures to act on the part of the Maine legislature.
Second, we doubt that the Maine legislature, having adjudged that persons under a
certain age are incapable of giving informed consent to the act of sexual inter-
course, would choose to penalize only a male under-aged partner for taking the
*. . risk of conceiving a child.
Id. at 502 n.15.
90. Id. at 502.
91. Id.
92. 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981) (in light of
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invalidated statutes proscribing statutory rape in areas under federal
jurisdiction. The court followed the approach of the Craig Court93 in
determining the actual purposes of the statutes and assumed, for pur-
poses of discussion, the truth of the proclaimed objectives: the preven-
tion of physical injury and pregnancy in females under sixteen. 94 The
Hicks court refused to accept bare assertions in lieu of a demonstrated
relationship between the classifications and statutory objectives, espe-
cially with criminal liability at issue. The court relied on Caban and
Craig as authority for its ruling that "once an appropriate party in-
vokes constitutional scrutiny of a statutory gender classification, the
government must shoulder the burdens of producing evidence and
proving a constitutionally-sufficient justification" for the discrimina-
tion.95 The court distinguished Rundlet and found that in Hicks, the
Government had neither demonstrated that males are, or should be,
held responsible for causing the prohibited sexual contact, nor that by
punishing only males the challenged statutes reduced the incidence of
pregnancy.96 The Hicks court also found no evidence that females are
the only victims of sexual contact or that they suffer physical injury
from such contact.
97
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Navedo v. Preisser, 98 in-
validated Iowa's statutory rape law that discriminated against males
over age twenty-five who engaged in intercourse with females under
sixteen. The State claimed that the statute was intended to protect mi-
nor females from pregnancy, physical injury, and emotional trauma.99
The State, however, introduced no evidence to demonstrate the validity
of these assertions and failed to justify its contention that females over
age twenty-five cannot physically harm males under age sixteen, or that
young females are more likely than young males to suffer emotional
distress."° Despite a prior ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court that the
Iowa Legislature had enacted the statute to reduce the incidence of
teenage pregnancy and its attendant problems, the Navedo court held
that "[a]lthough a court should accept the purpose of a statute offered
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)), rev'd, 657 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1981) (in
light of United States v. Sangrey, 648 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1981) (see infra note 227 for discus-
sion of Sangrey)).
93. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
94. 625 F.2d at 219-20 & n.5.
95. Id. at 219 (citing 441 U.S. 380 (1979); 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
96. 625 F.2d at 220-21 n.8.
97. Id. at 220.
98. 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 638.
100. Id. at 639-40.
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by the state or its courts, despite a lack of legislative history, we remain
free to inquire into the actual purpose of the statute if the proffered
justification is not plausible."''
The Navedo court relied on Meloon 02 in finding pregnancy pre-
vention rationales especially suspect as hindsight rationalizations. The
court also noted that the general doubts expressed by the First Circuit
were reinforced by the peculiar structure of the Iowa statute: By ex-
cluding males under twenty-five, the classification did not encompass
the very group most likely to impregnate teenage females. The court
concluded that this critical underinclusiveness vitiated the State's preg-
nancy prevention rationale. 0 3
In MichaelM, however, the Supreme Court distinguished Meloon
and Navedo 1' from Rundlell on the basis that New Hampshire and
Iowa had failed to establish a greater incidence of injury in females
than males, while Maine had done so. The Court drew a parallel be-
tween the heightened risk of injury established in Rundlell and Califor-
nia's demonstration that females "suffer disproportionately the
deleterious consequences of illegitimate pregnancy."'0 5 Furthermore,
the Court stated that because both the Meloon and Navedo courts had
held that pregnancy prevention was not the actual purpose of the chal-
lenged legislation, neither court had addressed the issue of whether the
respective classifications were substantially related to the prevention of
teenage pregnancy.
0 6
This statement evinces a misreading of Navedo. The Eighth Cir-
cuit clearly held that because the challenged statute excluded the class
of males most likely to impregnate minor females, it was impermissibly
underinclusive with respect to the pregnancy prevention rationale. 10 7
The opinion specifically states that "[b]ecause the state has failed to
show that its gender-based classification substantialy furthers the pre-
vention of. . . pregnancy caused by sexual intercourse with an older
person, we hold that the. . . statute. . . violates the equal protection
101. Id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 389; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
209 n.8 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 199 n.7; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
648 n.16 (1975)).
102. 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978)). See also supra text accom-
panying note 83.
103. 630 F.2d at 640-41.
104. No attempt was made to distinguish Hicks, which was then before the Court on
petition for certiorari. United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.),petftlonfor cert.filed,
49 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1980) (No. 80-602). See supra note 92.
105. 450 U.S. at 474 n.10.
106. Id.
107. 630 F.2d at 640-41.
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clause." 108
VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Purpose of Section 261.5
The finding of the California Supreme Court in Michael M that
pregnancy prevention is the purpose of section 261.5109 has no histori-
cal support, and it marks an abrupt break with that court's prior hold-
ings that the legislature enacted section 261.5 for the express purpose of
protecting the virtue of young females.'l 0
1. Historical background
Early English statutory rape laws contained a conclusive presump-
tion that a female below a certain age was incapable of consenting to
sexual intercourse.' The presumption was allegedly justified on the
ground that such females were incapable of exercising the judgment
and discretion necessary to give meaningful consent." 2 This consent
standard, which subsequently was incorporated into California's first
rape statute,' ' 3 was reiterated by the California Supreme Court in Peo-
ple v. Gordon. "II In its review of this early statutory rape prosecution,
the court stated that "[i]t is. . . a presumption of law that a girl under
ten years of age is incapable of consenting to the offense of rape."1 '
Several years later, in People v. Verdegreen, 116 the court explained that:
The obvious purpose of [the statute] is the protection of soci-
108. Id. at 641 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
109. 25 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 601 P.2d at 574-75, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43.
110. One year before the California Supreme Court's decision in Michael M, a state
court of appeal held that pregnancy prevention was the purpose of the California statute.
People v. McKellar, 81 Cal. App. 3d 367, 146 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1978).
The Court of Appeal cited no authority for this novel proposition but, instead, chose to
rely on the State's unsupported assertion that when the legislature enacted § 261.5, its pri-
mary concern was to prevent pregnancy in minor females. Id. at 369, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
At a subsequent hearing the California Supreme Court retransferred the case to the Court of
Appeal ordering that it be refiled with reference to MichaelM. People v. McKellar, No. CR
20594 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 1980).
111. Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw., ch. 13; 18 Eliz., ch. 7, § 4 (1576) (age of
consent 10 years).
112. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *211.
113. 1850 Cal. Stat. 234, ch. 99, § 47 (current statutory rape provision at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1982)). The statute contained a provision defining statutory rape
as intercourse with a female under the age of 10.
114. 70 Cal. 467, 11 P. 762 (1886).
115. Id. at 468, 11 P. at 763.
116. 106 Cal. 211, 39 P. 607 (1895) (defendant convicted of assault with intent to commit
statutory rape of seven-year-old girl).
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ety by protecting from violation the virtue of young and unso-
phisticated girls. . . It is the insidious approach and vile
tampering with their persons that primarily undermines the
virtue of young girls, and eventually destroys it; and the pre-
vention of this, as much as the principal act, must undoubt-
edly have been the intent of the legislature. The incapacity
extends to the act and all its incidents.'
17
While it seems reasonable to assume that a girl under ten is too
young to understand the nature and consequences of sexual inter-
course, this rationale fades as the age of consent approaches adulthood.
Yet, the age of consent in California was increased by statutory amend-
ment from ten to fourteen in 1889, to sixteen in 1897, and to its present
level, eighteen, in 1913.' 18 Moreover, although a minor female who
married with consent was deemed sufficiently emancipated and mature
to divorce and remarry without parental authority, 119 she still was
deemed incapable of consenting to extra-marital intercourse.'
20
Thus, when the legislature raised the age of consent to eighteen an
additional rationale must have supported this expansion of the statu-
tory provision. The California Supreme Court's holding in People v.
Hernandez121 is enlightening:
[T]he consent standard has been deemed to be required by
important policy goals. . . . The law's concern . . . is ex-
plained in part by a popular conception of the social, moral
and personal values which are preserved by the abstinence
from sexual indulgence on the part of a young woman. An
unwise disposition of her sexual favor is deemed to do harm
both to herself and the social mores by which the commu-
nity's conduct patterns are established. Hence, the law of stat-
utory rape intervenes in an effort to avoid such a
disposition. 122
117. Id. at 214-15, 39 P. at 608-09.
118. 1889 Cal. Stat. 223, ch. 191, § 1; 1897 Cal. Stat. 201, ch. 139, § 1; 1913 Cal. Stat. 212,
ch. 122, § 1 (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1982)).
119. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 204 (West 1982) (authority of parent ceases upon marriage of
child) (originally enacted 1872).
120. In People v. Courtney, 180 Cal. App. 2d 61, 4 Cal. Rptr. 274 (2d Dist. 1960) (defend-
ant convicted of statutory rape for engaging in intercouse with married woman under 18),
the Court of Appeal implicitly held that the only proper exercise of a minor female's sexual-
ity lay within the bonds of the conjugal relationship.
121. 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964) (girl 17 years and 9 months old
voluntarily engaged in intercourse with defendant, who was subsequently convicted of statu-
tory rape).
122. Id. at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The opinion underscores the over-
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Because the female has been deemed incapable of consent, it fol-
lows that males have been conclusively presumed responsible for the
act regardless of actual guilt or innocence. 2 3 Furthermore, because
California's statutory rape law has never imposed criminal sanctions
against adult females for engaging in sexual intercourse with under age
males, the law has reflected the legislature's belief that minor males,
unlike their female peers, have been capable of giving meaningful
consent. 124
This double standard conflicts with traditional social, legislative,
and judicial assumptions that females mature at an earlier age than do
males.'2 1 One study of sexually active teenage males concluded that
many were mentally unprepared to understand the nature and conse-
riding value the court placed on the protection of female chastity when female choice con-
flicted with the preservation of social mores. By labeling the decision to engage in sexual
activity unwise, the court also cast a negative reflection on the ability of young women to
make meaningful choices about their sexuality.
123. For example, in Hernandez, the supreme court held that males would be conclu-
sively presumed criminally responsible for the occurrence, even if they were young and na-
ive and only responding to the female's advances. Id. The inequitable consequences of this
presumption are graphically illustrated in State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo. 1923), where the
record indicated that "[a] number of callow youths, of otherwise blameless lives" were se-
duced by a sexually active minor female. The court found that "[t]he boys were immature
and doubtless more sinned against than sinning"; questioned the soundness of Missouri's
statutory rape law in that it criminalized male behavior under any circumstances; but held
that "courts must construe the statute as they find it." Id. at 632.
124. L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 19 (1969).
125. "Universally, the young female, but not the male, has been considered to be incapa-
ble of consenting to sexual relations, though for all other purposes--contracts, property
ownership, capacity to sue and be sued-she might reach the age of majority years before
the male." Id. at 9. For example, in Jacobson v. Lenhard, 30 Ill. 2d 225, 228, 195 N.E.2d
638, 640 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a state law permitting females to bring
legal actions at an earlier age than males, concluding that the sexual disparity was reason-
able in light of "legislative and judicial recognition that females mature physically, emotion-
ally and mentally before male[s]"; and in Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 319, 517 P.2d
1010, 1012 (1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a state statute
that set the age of majority for males at 21 and for females at 18, reiterating the common
assumption that "girls tend generally to mature physically, emotionally and mentally before
boys."
The California Legislature also recognized a disparity between the chronological ages
of males and females and the ages at which they reached maturity. "As originally enacted in
1872, former § 56 of the California Civil Code read: 'Any unmarried male of the age of
eighteen years or upwards, and any unmarried female of the age of fifteen years or upwards,
.. . are capable of consenting to and consummating marriage."' Historical Note to CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4101 (West 1970) (quoting former CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 (1872)). In 1921, the
ages were changed to 21 and 18 respectively. 1921 Cal. Stat. 333, ch. 233, § 1. It was not
until 1971 that the ages for both sexes were equalized at 18. 1971 Cal. Stat. 3747, ch. 1748,
§ 26 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101 (West Supp. 1982)).
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quences of their sexual activities.' 26 In light of these factors, it could
also be argued that teenage boys are incapable of giving meaningful
consent to sexual intercourse. Moreover, California law has long rec-
ognized the capacity of both minor males and females to give informed
consent in situations where the potential impact on their lives was as
great as or greater than decisions involving sexual intercourse.' 27 Thus,
the class of individuals to which the consent standard applied was both
over and underinclusive: It included females who did not need protec-
tion and excluded males incapable of giving meaningful consent. If the
purpose of the consent standard was to protect the immature and the
unsophisticated, the means chosen to effectuate that purpose was,
therefore, seriously flawed. Conversely, if the consent standard is
viewed as a means of preserving female chastity as a social good, it
reflects a rationally based method of effectuating that purpose, however
illegitimate that purpose may be.
By the time Michael M reached the California Supreme Court in
1979, it was clear that the substitution of another and legitimate pur-
pose was crucial to the continued viability of section 261.5 because the
United States Supreme Court had declared that "[a] gender-based clas-
sification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates addi-
tional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive
equal protection scrutiny."' 28 The United States Supreme Court im-
plied as much in Michael M. when it stated that so long as pregnancy
prevention was deemed to be one of the purposes of section 261.5, the
statute could then be upheld "[e]ven if the preservation of female chas-
tity were one of the motives of the statute and even if that motive be
impermissible." 2 9
2. Pregnancy prevention - the modern rationale
Had the California Supreme Court followed the precedent it es-
126. Finkel, Sexual and Contraceptive Knowledge,,Attitudes, and Behavior ofMale 4doles.
cents, 7 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 256 (1975).
127. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 34.5 (West Supp. 1981) (unmarried minors may con-
sent to medical treatment regarding prevention, treatment, or termination of pregnancy, and
such consent not subject to disaffirmance because of minority) (originally enacted in 1953:
See 1953 Cal. Stat. 3383, ch. 1654, § 1); 34.6 (West Supp. 1981) (all minors 15 years of age or
older living apart from parents or guardians may consent to medical treatment) (originally
enacted in 1968: See 1968 Cal. Stat. 785, ch. 371, § I); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West Supp.
1981) (all minors over 14 are responsible for their criminal conduct) (originally enacted in
1872); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1406 (West 1956) (all minors over 14 may appoint guardians ad
litem) (originally enacted in 1931: See 1931 Cal. Stat. 670, repealed 1979).
128. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282-83 (1979).
129. 450 U.S. at 472 n.7.
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tablished in Arp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 130 it is ap-
parent that the court would not have found pregnancy prevention to be
the purpose underlying section 261.5 in Michael M The Arp court
considered a challenge to a statute containing a conclusive presumption
that all widows were dependent on their husband's earnings but which
required widowers affirmatively to prove their dependency in order to
establish entitlement to workers compensation death benefits. The
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board had asserted that men and wo-
men were not similarly situated with respect to economic factors, and
that the legislature had designed the statute to redress the effects of past
economic discrimination against females. The court found the argu-
ment speculative, reviewed the legislative history of the statute, and de-
termined that the statute was the product of archaic and overbroad
sexual stereotypes that clearly underlay later, similar legislation. The
court cited Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld13 1 and Craig v. Boren, 32 and held
that it was not "compelled to accept without inquiry 'the mere recita-
tion of a benign, compensatory purpose,' particularly when that pur-
pose [was] 'not at all self-evident' and in fact seem[ed] historically
improbable."'
133
In sharp contrast to its holding in Arp, the same court in Michael
M. upheld, without further inquiry, the State's unsupported assertion
that pregnancy prevention is the purpose underlying section 261.5.11
In finding that the legislature could reasonably have concluded that by
penalizing only males the statute would redress the increased risks and
adverse consequences faced by the minor female, 135 the court ignored
the language and legislative history of the statute. The court also disre-
garded its own earlier rulings in People v. Hernandez'36 and People v.
Verdegreen 137 that section 261.5 was enacted to protect female chastity.
In its review of Michael M., the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressed doubts regarding its ability to ascertain the actual purpose of a
statute and stated that any search was likely to prove "hazardous" and
"elusive."' 138 The Court began its inquiry into the purpose of section
130. 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977).
131. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). See also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
132. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also supra notes 54-55 & 61-64 and accompanying text.
133. Arp, 19 Cal. 3d at 404, 563 P.2d at 854, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
134. 25 Cal. 3d at 612, 601 P.2d at 575-76, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
135. Id. at 613, 601 P.2d at 575-76, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
136. 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964). See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 121-22.
137. 106 Cal. 211, 39 P. 607 (1895). See also supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
138. 450 U.S. at 469-70.
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261.5 by noting that when the California Legislature criminalized sex-
ual intercourse with minor females, it intended to discourage that con-
duct. The Court found the actual legislative motivation underlying the
enactment of the statute unclear and suggested several hypotheses to
explain why individual legislators might have desired such a result: the
prevention of teenage pregnancies; the protection of young females
from physical injury or from the loss of chastity; and the promotion of
various religious and moral attitudes toward premarital sex. 139 The
Court noted that the pregnancy prevention rationale offered by the
State had been accepted by the California Supreme Court and cited
Reitman v. Mulkey 40 for the proposition* that such a finding was enti-
tled to great deference. The Court was satisfied that the prevention of
illegitimate teenage pregnancy was at least one of the purposes of the
statute. It concluded that although Wiesenfeld established that a state's
asserted reason for the enactment of a statute could be rejected if it
could not have been a goal of the legislature, Michael A. was not such
a case.1
4 1
The Court's reliance on Reitman is misplaced. There, the Court
deferred to the California Supreme Court's finding that an amendment
to the California Constitution had a racially discriminatory motive. In
that case, the amendment had been subjected to an exhaustive review
by the California Supreme Court. Because the challenge had been
made within months of the amendment's passage, the Reitman Court
was unable to compare prior and possibly conflicting holdings by the
state court regarding the scope and effect of the amendment. Further-
more, the Reitman Court indicated that it might have rejected the state
court's finding had the party defending the statute offered a persuasive
reason for its rejection. 42 In contrast, the Michael A. Court had the
opportunity to compare decisions spanning the 130-year history of the
statute. Such a comparison would have illustrated the abrupt break
Michael M. represented with respect to prior California Supreme
Court determinations as to the purpose of section 261.5. Unlike Ret-
man, in Michael H. the state court's finding was grounded in judicial
speculation and the State's unfounded assertion of a compensatory pur-
pose. 43 Moreover, the petitioner raised several convincing arguments
139. Id.
140. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
141. 450 U.S. at 470.
142. 387 U.S. at 374-76, 381, and see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
143. The California Supreme Court found that the injurious effects of pregnancy on un-
wed minors were "substantial" and "far-reaching" and might well include severe mental
and physical trauma. The court cited state statutes that provided all minors with protection
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to refute the State's contention that pregnancy prevention was the ac-
tual purpose of section 261.5. He noted that such a rationale was un-
supported by the language, effect, or prior judicial interpretation of the
statute, and he warned that such a rationale was susceptible to use as a
justification for a law enacted for impermissible reasons.1
44
As Justices Brennan and Mosk pointed out, the pregnancy preven-
tion rationale seems historically improbable.1 45 At its inception, the
statute protected only females under age ten who were incapable of
conception. 46 The drafters' notes to the first reenactment in 1872 con-
tain no mention of such a rationale. Instead, in recognition that a girl
under age ten was incapable of legal consent, the legislature reenacted
the statute to protect her from sexual exploitation. 47 Before the statu-
tory age was fixed at eighteen in'1913, amendments that raised the age
of consent to fourteen, and then sixteen, still excluded the majority of
unwed fertile teenage females.
1 48
The historical evidence suggests a more plausible explanation for
these amendments. Significantly, the formulation of the pregnancy
prevention rationale coincided with an increase of epidemic propor-
tions in the rate of illegitimate births to underage mothers. 49 There
have been, however, no substantive changes in section 261.5 since
1913.150 Accordingly, one is led to the inference that this rationale did
from sexual abuse and concluded that "[s]ection 261.5 merely provides additional protection
for minor females in recognition of the demonstrably greater injury, physical and emotional,
which they may suffer." 25 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 601 P.2d at 575-76, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
144. Brief of the Petitioner at 24-27, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
145. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 494-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at
617-21, 601 P.2d at 578-80, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 346-48 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
146. 1850 Cal. Stat. 234, ch. 99, § 47 (current statutory rape provision at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981)).
147. Code Commissioners' Note (following CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.1 (1872)).
148. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. In Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1977), the First Circuit questioned the rationale under-
lying similar amendments to New Hampshire's statutory rape law and held that "[w]ithout
some concrete indication from the state as to the reasons behind these changes we cannot
believe that such disregard for whether or not some or any of the class of females protected
are of child bearing age is reconcilable with a pregnancy prevention rationale." Id. at 607.
149. See 450 U.S. at 470 n.3; 25 Cal. 3d at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
The epidemic rise in the pregnancy rate, however, has been confined largely to a white popu-
lation while the rate for blacks has remained relatively stable. Phipps-Yonas, Teenage Preg-
nancy and Motherhood, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 403-04, 424 (1980). "Thus,
although the present-day problems of teenage childbearing are but a recurrent chapter in a
long history for black Americans, we now have a 'crisis' because so many white families are
involved." Id. at 424. If this "crisis" was an impetus for the assertion of pregnancy preven-
tion as the purpose underlying § 261.5, it follows that the substitution of such a rationale
was, in part, racially motivated. -
150. See supra note 2 and infra note 159.
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not motivate the enactment in the first instance but, instead, was sup-
plied by attorneys for the State as a timely hindsight rationalization for
a law enacted by the legislature for an entirely different and constitu-
tionally impermissible purpose.1 5'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk pointed to the rise in the
age of marital consent: "[T]he age defining this offense was undoubt-
edly increased because popular views changed both with regard to the
suitable age of women for marriage and the age until which they were
deemed appropriately subject to protective legislation."'' 52 Even after
the age defining the offense was raised to include all minor females
capable of conception, the California Supreme Court continued to as-
sert that the statute was designed to prevent "sexual indulgence on the
part of a young woman" so as to protect her from "an unwise disposi-
tion of her sexual favor."' 53 Thus, case law is inconsistent with a preg-
nancy prevention rationale and, instead, supports the view that the
legislative goal was to protect the virtue of minor females. 5 4
Any other legislative purpose seems to be precluded by the lan-
guage of the statute itself. Logically if the purpose of section 261.5
were pregnancy prevention, the statute would provide for a defense
based on the use of birth control or the inability to conceive or impreg-
nate. 55 Male culpability, however, is not defined in terms of risk-tak-
151. See Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 607 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950
(1977). Moreover, facts which invited the assertion of a pregnancy prevention rationale
were conspicuous in three statutory rape cases spanning a period of 67 years, but California
prosecutors failed to invoke such a rationale: People v. Fritz, 72 Cal. App. 3d 319, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1977) (prosecutrix testified she missed menstrual period and thought she was preg-
nant); People v. Fremont, 47 Cal. App. 2d 341, 117 P.2d 891 (1941) (defendant testified to
use of contraceptive); People v. Currie, 14 Cal. App. 67, 111 P. 108 (1910) (prosecutrix im-
pregnated by defendant).
A final reason can be advanced for the substitution of the pregnancy prevention ration-
ale: It is no longer fashionable to speak openly of female chastity as "such a precious jewel
in the crown of maidenly graces that it cannot be stolen or removed therefrom even with the
consent of the wearer, without offending the majesty of the law." Watson v. Tyler, 35 Okla.
768, 774, 131 P. 922, 925 (1913) (consent no defense to civil action for damages for assault to
commit statutory rape). Thus, today, the use of the traditional consent standard to justify
the legislative enactment of§ 261.5 might prove too embarrassing for all but the most insu-
lar sexist. See L. TRIBE, supra note 45, § 16-30, at 1085.
152. Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 619, 601 P.2d at 579, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). "Thus, section 56 of the Civil Code of 1872 fixed 15 as the age at which a female
could marry without parental consent, but in 1921 the age was raised to 18." Id. (citations
and footnote omitted).
153. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17 & 121-22.
155. The California Supreme Court suggested that these defenses were omitted because
the legislature may not have wanted the prosecutrix to be subjected on cross-examination to
such "additionally embarrassing details," even where she has already testified to the "em-
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ing activity. Furthermore, the statute does not subject females to
criminal sanctions; the exclusion of half of all potential violators seri-
ously undermines the pregnancy prevention rationale.1
56
After Michael M. was decided by the California Supreme Court,
proposals to change section 261.5 to gender-neutral status were intro-
duced for legislative consideration but died in committee before they
could be put to a vote.'57 From this fact, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the California Legislature considered and re-
jected these proposals, and, in so doing, ratified the state court's finding
that pregnancy prevention was the actual purpose of the statute.1
58
At least two difficulties with this conclusion are apparent. First, it
could be argued that the recodification of section 261.5 after the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez 59 ratified the Her-
nandez court's finding that it was "in the public interest to protect the
sexually naive female from exploitation.' ' ° Second, when a proposed
bill dies in committee, it seems inappropriate to infer that the modifica-
tion it embodied was considered and rejected on the merits so as to
ratify a prior judicial finding of statutory purpose, especially when the
Court has previously spoken to this issue and found the inference with-
out merit.' 61 The only explicit support for a pregnancy prevention ra-
tionale cited by the Court was the preamble to the Pregnancy Freedom
barrassing details" of sexual intercourse. 25 Cal. 3d at 613, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at
343.
The court further speculated that the legislature may have believed that the efficacy of
contraceptives was doubtful and that the legislature may have been reluctant to rely on the
truth of the claim of non-emission. Id. This argument, however, ignores the demonstrated
efficacy of certain birth control devices and their availability to the teenage population. .d.
at 620 n.3, 601 P.2d at 580 n.3, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 348 n.3 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
156. The California Supreme Court hypothesized that the legislature may have con-
cluded that because the female might suffer the problems of pregnancy, it might be reason-
able to consider her a victim. Id. at 613, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
157. Cal. A.B. 1588, 1979-80, Cal. Reg. Legis. Sess. (1980); Cal. S. 2045, 1979-80, Cal.
Reg. Legis. Sess. (1980).
158. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471 n.6.
159. Hernandez was decided in 1964. In 1970 the prohibition against statutory rape was
separated from the forcible rape provisions of§ 261 and recodified as § 261.5. The recodifi-
cation in no way changed the definition of the offense.
160. 61 Cal. 2d at 535, 393 P.2d at 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 365. The A.C.L.U. advanced this
proposition in its amicus brief. Brief of the A.C.L.U. and the A.C.L.U. of Northern Califor-
nia in Support of Petitioner, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). It noted
that the prevention of pregnancy was not mentioned in Hernandez; instead the statute was
held to promote "abstinence from sexual indulgence" on the part of young women. The
A.C.L.U. concluded that "[i]nasmuch as there is no evidence that the California legislature
repudiated this reading of the statutory purpose when it re-enacted the provision in 1970, it
may properly be deemed to have adopted it." Id. at 18-19.
161. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61,69-70 (1946) (when a bill dies in committee it
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of Choice Act. This legislation, however, was enacted long after the
legislature considered the purpose underlying section 261.5 and en-
acted or amended that statute.1
62
In summary, the State was unable satisfactorily to link legislative
amendments to section 261.5 to a pregnancy prevention rationale, his-
tory and legal precedent do not support this rationale, and it seems to
have been supplied as an afterthought to justify the validity of section
261.5. As previously noted, under the intermediate scrutiny test, when
a statute can be justified only by rationales that did not, in fact, contrib-
ute to its enactment, the statute should be invalidated. 63 Thus, by ac-
cording great deference to the state court's finding, without further
inquiry into the actual purpose of section 261.5, the United States
Supreme Court compounded the state court's failure to apply a critical
element of the intermediate scrutiny test as articulated in Wiesenfeld
and its progeny.
B. The Connection between the Gender Classifcation and the
Pregnancy Prevention Rationale
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, once the party challenging a
statute establishes that the law discriminates on the basis of gender, the
burden of proving that the classification is substantially related to an
important state objective shifts to the State. 6  Section 261.5 is discrim-
inatory on its face: Only females can be victims and only males can be
violators. 65 Because the purported goal of the statute is to reduce the
incidence of teenage pregnancy, the discriminatory provisions of sec-
tion 261.5 can be justified only by a showing that they are a more effec-
tive means of achieving that goal than a comparable, but gender-
is treacherous to find consent in legislative silence where no affirmative recognition of judi-
cial interpretation exists).
162. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 471 n.6. The preamble reads: "The legislature recognizes
that pregnancy among unmarried persons under 21 years of age constitutes an increasing
social problem in California." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16145 (West 1980) (enacted as
the Pregnancy Freedom of Choice Act, ch. 1190, § 2, 1977 Cal. Stat. 3919).
163. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
164. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. See also supra note 77 and accom-
panying text. In Michael M., the State met its burden of proving that California has an
important if not compelling interest in preventing pregnancy in unwed minor females. Ex-
tensive evidence demonstrated the severity of the problem and the repercussions for such
females and the state itself. 450 U.S. at 470-71 & nn.3-5; 25 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 601 P.2d at
574-75, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43.
165. Both courts recognized that the statute discriminates on the basis of sex. MichaelM.,
450 U.S. at 466; Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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neutral, statute.166 It should not be sufficient for the State merely to
assert that by penalizing only males, section 261.5 serves as a more ef-
fective deterrent to teenage pregnancy than a gender-neutral statute;
the State's demonstration should be persuasive. 167 If the State is un-
able to make such a showing, the Court would be expected to invali-
date the statute on the grounds that its classification is not substantially
related to the statute's purpose or that pregnancy prevention could not
be the actual purpose of the statute and that, therefore, no sufficiently
important purpose is advanced by the discriminatory classification.
68
1. Deterrent effect and underinclusiveness
Had the Court applied these requirements, the State's admission of
uncertainty would have been fatal to its case: "[T]he question of deter-
rence is one that is very difficult to answer; we don't know how many
people have or have not been deterred by the existence of the statute
.. .. ,169 The Court, however, did not examine the efficacy of the
challenged statute as a deterrent to teenage pregnancy but determined,
without further analysis, that the statute was "sufficiently related to the
State's objectives to pass constitutional muster."'
' 70
This omission from the Court's analysis stands in dramatic con-
trast to the Court's analysis in Craig. '71 There, the Court dismissed
abundant data amassed by the State in its attempt to demonstrate a
connection between male drinking and traffic accidents with the caveat
that "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious
business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative phi-
166. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979); Orr v. Off, 440 U.S. 268,
281 (1979) (gender-based statutes invalid where less discriminatory means of protecting
states' interests available).
167. "[T]he burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly dis-
criminates on the basis of sex to advance an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the
challenged classification." Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (citations omit-
ted); accord Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980); see also supra
note 77 and accompanying text.
168. The Craig Court chose to accept for purposes of discussion the district court's identi-
fication of the statutory objective as the enhancement of traffic safety. 429 U.S. at 199.
When further analysis indicated that the State's statistical showing did not support the al-
leged objective, it was concluded that the relationship between the discriminatory classifica-
tion and the purported objective was "unduly tenuous," id. at 202, that the gender-based
classification did "not bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, "id.
at 211 (Powell, J., concurring), and that it was "difficult to believe that the statute was actu-
ally intended to cope with the problem of traffic safety." Id. at 213 (Stevens, J., concurring).
169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981).
170. 450 U.S. at 473.
171. 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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losophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause."' InMichaelM,
the Court did not even require the State to offer data of any kind, but
accepted at face value the State's assertion that section 261.5's discrimi-
natory classification directly attacks the problem of teenage
pregnancy. 
7
A gender-based statutory rape law seems a singularly ineffective
deterrent to the proscribed conduct. Many who violate section 261.5
are unaware of its existence, and the offense, normally committed in
private between consenting parties, is ordinarily not subject to detec-
tion or report. 74 Statistics introduced by the State, indicating innu-
merable violations but few arrests, support this conclusion. 7- Peer
influence, not legislative enactments, plays the greatest role in the en-
couragement or deterrence of illicit intercourse, 76 and if "adolescent
males disregard the possibility of pregnancy far more than do adoles-
cent females,"'"1 7 it is further proof of the ineffectiveness of the statu-
tory proscription.
a. Juslqfcation for exclusion offemales from criminal penally
If the California Legislature did, in fact, enact section 261.5 to de-
ter teenage pregnancy, the exclusion of females from criminal penalty
seems a curious omission. The Michael M Court, however, refused to
find the statute impermissibly underinclusive. 7 The Court reasoned
that even if a female were to play an active role in the prohibited activ-
ity, her exclusion from criminal sanctions would be justified because
172. 429 U.S. at 204.
173. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472.
174. See, e.g., Brief of the Petitioner at 5, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25, Michael M. v. Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464 (1981); Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation
and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 78 (1952).
175. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 493 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Between 1975-1978, 61
juvenile males and 352 adult males were arrested for statutory rape. In 1976, there were an
estimated 50,000 pregnancies among 13 to 17-year-olds. By roughly extrapolating the inci-
dence of illicit intercourse and comparing it with arrest statistics for the same period, it is
apparent that § 261.5 does not act as a significant deterrent. Id.
176. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at
362; Phipps-Yonas, supra note 149, at 413; M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 169 (1962).
As Justice Stevens recognized, the belief that the risk of pregnancy constitutes a sub-
stantial deterrent to the young female is a "rather fanciful notion." MichaelM., 450 U.S. at
498 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He observed that "[l]ocal custom and belief-rather than statu-
tory laws of venerable but doubtful ancestry-will determine the volume of sexual activity
among unmarried teenagers." Id. at 496 & n.l.
177. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 480 (Stewart, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 473.
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the statute was designed for her protection,'79 and the risk of pregnancy
itself provides a substantial deterrent factor.'8 0 The Court justified pe-
nalizing males alone on the ground that the deterrent effect of a crimi-
nal penalty roughly equalizes the natural sanction that deters
females.'"'
However, "[i]n our system of justice, offenders are not deemed less
culpable merely because they may suffer additional punishment from
sources outside the legal system."'8 2 Any disproportionate impact suf-
fered by the female is a consequence, not a cause, of her act. 83 While
pregnancy might "constitute a legitimate mitigating factor in deciding
what, if any, punishment might be appropriate," increased risk has no
relevance to culpability.
8 4
Moreover, as noted by Justice Stevens, the fact that a minor female
is subject to greater risk of the consequences of intercourse is a logical
justification for her inclusion in the classification, not her exclusion. 85
Her exemption is unreasonable in terms of the burdens on the state that
result from teenage pregnancy.'8 6 Additionally, if the state asserts an
interest in protecting her from harm her exclusion suggests that the dis-
crimination is "actually perverse." Justice Stevens asks: "Would a ra-
tional parent making rules for the conduct of twin children of opposite
sex simultaneously forbid the son and authorize the daughter to engage
in conduct that is especially harmful to the daughter? That is the effect
of this statutory classification."'' 87
179. Id. Accord Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 614, 601 P.2d at 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
180. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473.
181. Id. Justice Stewart also justified the discriminatory provisions of § 261.5 on the
ground that the statute was part of a wider nondiscriminatory statutory scheme enacted to
regulate the sexual behavior of minors with minors and adults with minors. He cited several
California statutes that protect and punish victims and offenders of both sexes and noted
that § 261.5 only provides an "additional measure of punishment for males who engage in
sexual intercourse with [minor females]." Id. at 476-77 & nn.2-6 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). But, as Justice Mosk stated, "the fact that [these] statutes are gender-
neutral does not somehow give the Legislature the right to enact an 'additional' law on the
topic that invidiously discriminates on sexual grounds." Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 622, 601
P.2d at 581, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
182. Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 622, 601 P.2d at 581, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. The Court noted that half of all teenage pregnancies end in abortion and suggested
that children who were born to unwed teenagers were likely to become wards of the state.
Id. at 471 & n.5.
187. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Ironically, the stereotypes perpetuated by § 261.5 may serve to increase the incidence of
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b. enforcement
A second ground for the MichaelM Court's refusal to find section
261.5 impermissibly underinclusive was the belief that if females were
subject to prosecution, they would be unlikely to complain, rendering
the statute incapable of enforcement.188 As the dissenting opinions
noted, however, this reasoning is unpersuasive. Female testimony is
not the only available evidence of the violation; when it is, the prosecu-
tor has the option of offering immunity in exchange for it.'8 9 More-
over, a gender-neutral law would subject twice as many potential
violators to arrest and, therefore, seems the more effective deterrent
even if fewer numbers would actually be prosecuted. 90
Other California statutes govern sexual activity with minors in
gender-neutral language. 91 Furthermore, at the time Michael M was
decided most jurisdictions had enacted gender-neutral statutory rape
laws. 92 These enactments refute the conclusion that the substitution of
pregnancy in unwed adolescents. The studies introduced by the State and cited by both
courts as evidence of the severity of the problem of illegitimate teenage pregnancy suggest
that many sexually active teenage females who do not use contraceptives report that they
participate in intercourse because the male expects them to do so. C. CHILMAN, ADOLES-
CENT SEXUALrIY IN A CHANGING AMERICAN SOCIETY 137 (1978). Such females often es-
pouse traditional attitudes toward the female role including a passive and dependent
approach to male-female relationships, id. at 164, and the belief that "nice girls" do not plan
to engage in intercourse. Phipps-Yonas, supra note 149, at 410. Female adolescents who
hold such beliefs may view pregnancy as a beneficial condition which may serve to resolve a
sense of dependency and as a source of self-esteem. Id.
188. Michael[M., 450 U.S. at 473-74.
189. Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 622, 601 P.2d at 581, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
190. MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 493-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261 (West Supp. 1982) (forcible rape), 272 (West Supp.
1982) (contributing to the delinquency of a minor), 286 (West Supp. 1982) (sodonly), 288
(West Supp. 1982) (lewd and lascivious conduct upon the body of a child under 14), 288a
(West Supp. 1982) (oral copulation), 311.2(b) (West Supp. 1982) (distribution of obscene
matter depicting minors engaging in sexual acts), 311.4 (West Supp. 1982) (employment of
minor to perform prohibited sexual acts), 647a (West Supp. 1982) (molesting child under
18).
192. Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ Il.41.410(a)(3), (4)(A), (B), .4 40(a)(1) (Supp. 1981); Ari-
zona, Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (West 1978); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-
1803(l)(c), 1804(1), 1806(1) (1977) (Commentary: "[The] elimination of references to the
gender of offender and victim ... is ... fundamental ... since it is difficult to justify
treating the 18-year-old male who seduces a 13-year-old female any differently from the 18-
year-old female who seduces the 13-year-old male."); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
403(l)(e), (1) (1978); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a)(1) (West Supp.
1981); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 1976); Hawaii, HAWAII Rnv. STAT. § 707-
731(l)(b) (Supp. 1979) ("[A]mended ... to remove sexually discriminatory language."); Il-
linois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1l-4(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1979); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-42-4-3(a), (c) (Burns 1981); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.3, .4 (West 1979); Kansas,
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non-discriminatory terminology would undermine the enforcement of
section 261.5.193 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan pointed out
that the State had offered no evidence that jurisdictions with gender-
neutral laws "have been handicapped by the enforcement problems the
plurality [found] so persuasive." He suggested that if such evidence
existed, the State surely would have introduced it.194 He concluded
that "[t]he State's failure to prove that a gender-neutral law would be a
less effective deterrent than a gender-based law, like the State's failure
to prove that a gender-neutral law would be difficult to enforce, should
have led [the] Court to invalidate § 261.5."' 191
The Court discounted these arguments and relied, instead, on the
prior decision of the California Supreme Court in Michael M The
Court again cited Reitman for the proposition that, when various spec-
ulations as to the effect of a law are plausible, it is appropriate to defer
to the judgment of the state court where, as here, it is more familiar
KAN STAT. ANN. § 21-3503(1)(a) (Supp. 1981); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 510.040(1)(b)(2), .050(1), .060(1)(b) (1975); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(4)
(West Supp. 1981); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 252(l)(A), 254(1) (Supp.
1981); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 463(a)(3), B(a)(3), C(a)(2), (3) (Supp. 1981);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 23 (West Supp. 1981); Michigan, MICH.
CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b(l)(a), (b), .520d(1)(a) (Supp. 1981); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.342(a), (b), .344(a), (b), (West Supp. 1981); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.030(3),
.050(1) (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1981); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(3) (1981);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1)(c) (1979); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.368
(1981); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 X, XI, :3 (Supp. 1981); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a) (West Supp. 1981); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-1 1(A)(1), (B)(1) (1978); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (Supp.
1981); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03(l)(d), (2)(a), -05(1) (Supp. 1981);
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(3), .04(A) (Page 1975 & Supp. 1980); Penn-
sylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122 (Purdon Supp. 1981); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-2(A) (Supp. 1981); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1980); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1(4), (5) (Supp. 1981); Ten-
nessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3703(a)(4), -3711(a) (Supp. 1981); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-401, -402(2) (Supp. 1979); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3252(3) (Supp. 1981);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.070, .090 (Supp. 1981); West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE § 61-8B-3(a)(3) (1977); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(l)(d), (2)(e) (West
Supp. 1981); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-303(a)(v), -305 (1977).
193. Justice Mosk considered this legislative reform significant:
[I]t refutes the majority's argument that it is necessary to exclude minor females
from the statutory proscription in order to insure its enforcement: in every juris-
diction in which statutory rape is now defined as sexual intercourse by a "person"
with a "person" who is under age ..., the minor female in a case such as the one
before us would be equally punishable with the minor male .... mhe reform
[also] demonstrates the widespread belief of our sister states that the purposes of
gender-based statutory rape laws ... can be just as effectively served by gender-
neutral statutes on the same subject.
MichaelM., 25 Cal. 3d at 623, 601 P.2d at 582, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 350 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
194. Michael M., 450 U.S. 492-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 494.
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with the factual and legal milieu of the challenged statute. 96 This reli-
ance on Reitman is once again misplaced. 197 The California court con-
ducted no meaningful inquiry into the effect of section 261.5. Its
holding on this issue was based on the unproven assertions offered by
the State. Thus, Michael M. is closer to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 19" where
the Supreme Court overturned the Massachusetts high court's uncriti-
cal acceptance of asserted statutory purposes after de novo inquiry in-
dicated that the announced goals could not reasonably be regarded as
actual legislative aims. 199
2. Overinclusiveness
The contention that section 261.5 is impermissibly overinclusive
was treated by the Court in a conclusory fashion. Although the statute
encompasses all prepubescent females, and therefore covers a far larger
class than the pregnancy prevention rationale warrants, the Court re-
jected as "ludicrous" the suggestion that the statute should be limited
in scope to older teenagers.200 Accordingly, it avoided the reasoned
conclusion that section 261.5 is as overinclusive as the statute over-
turned in Meloon v. Helgemoe.2 °' The Court also ignored the class of
fertile adolescents who take affirmative steps to prevent contraception.
If pregnancy prevention is, as the State asserted, the actual purpose
underlying section 261.5, it is puzzling that the legislature would bar
proof of the use of birth control or absence of fertility as a defense.
3. Irrebuttable presumption
Ironically, the Court had both to employ and ignore sexual stereo-
types to uphold section 261.5. The Court concluded that because males
inflicted pregnancy on young women,20 2 males were the logical class to
penalize. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the age of the male
was irrelevant "since young men are as capable as older men of in-
flicting the harm sought to be prevented. ' 20 3 The Court embraced the
196. Id. at 474 n.10.
197. See supra text accompanying note 142.
198. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
199. Id. at 443; and see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
200. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 475.
201. 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1977). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 84-86 & 91.
202. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 475.
203. Id. Justice Stewart also considered the age of the male irrelevant, but his conclusion
was grounded in the belief that males of any age and females under 18 were not similarly
situated with respect to the consequences of sexual intercourse. Id. at 480 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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reasoning of the California Supreme Court that because only females
can become pregnant, and because males "are the only persons who
may physiologically cause the result which the law properly seeks to
avoid," "it inevitably follows that sex is the only possible and therefore
necessary classification which can be adopted in identifying offender
and victim." 2°4
This reasoning is seriously flawed. Pregnancy is not a disease car-
ried by males who, "like 'Typhoid Mary,' infect others while never con-
tracting the disease themselves." 205 Where the sexual act is consensual,
both parties must be presumed responsible if pregnancy occurs.20 6 Sec-
tion 261.5, however, does not require proof that the male is the aggres-
sor or somehow the more responsible party. Because only the male is
punished, the statute reflects a legislative presumption that the male
alone is culpable, regardless of the circumstances. 207 As Justice Stevens
observed in his dissenting opinion: "[The possibility that such a habit-
ual attitude may reflect nothing more than an irrational prejudice
makes it an insufficient justification for discriminatory treatment that is
otherwise blatantly unfair.
20 8
4. Prosecutorial use
The State argued in Michael Af that the classification was justified
because it "is commonly employed in situations involving force, prosti-,
tution, pornography or coercion due to status relationships," 209 and
204. Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (emphasis in
original). Justice Brennan referred to this statement as "a remarkable display of sexual ster-
eotyping." Michael M., 450 U.S. at 490 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981).
206. Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 621, 601 P.2d at 580, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's holding on this issue confficts with the dissenting opinion in
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), in which he joined: "Both parents are [to be
presumed] equally responsible for the conception of a child out of wedlock." Id. at 404 &
n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at
362: "[E]ven in circumstances where a girl's actual comprehension contradicts the law's
presumption [of her incapacity to consent], the male is deemed criminally responsible for the
act, although himself young and naive and responding to advances which may have been
made to him."
208. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Brief of Respondent at 3, 24-25, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(citing People v. Dunn, 107 Cal. App. 3d 138, 165 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1980) (acts of intercourse
by pimp with 15-year-old prostitutes); People v. Rocca, 106 Cal. App. 3d 685, 165 Cal. Rptr.
226 (1980) (youth facility supervisor engaged in intercourse with minor trustee); People v.
Lewis, 113 Cal. App. 2d 468, 248 P.2d 461 (1952) and People v. Zeihm, 40 Cal. App. 3d
1085, 115 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1974) (acts of intercourse with minor females during ifiming of
19831
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that it was "being employed in the instant case in the context of forcible
conduct."21 The practice of charging defendants with violations of
statutory rape laws in situations where forcible rape cannot be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt appears to be common in other jurisdic-
tions. It is reflected in the majority of statutory rape cases cited with
approval by the Michael M Court.2 1 1 Although these cases were ex-
pressly tried on the theory that consent was neither an issue nor a de-
fense, it is clear that the focus was on culpability and not on gender.212
pornographic movies); People v. Alva, 90 Cal. App. 3d 418, 153 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1979) and
People v. Fritts, 72 Cal. App. 3d 319, 140 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977) (males exercised dominance
over minor females based on father-daughter, stepfather-daughter relationships,
respectively).
210. Brief of Respondent at 23, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). In
oral arguments before the Court, the State noted:
[T]he victim clearly testified, under oath at the preliminary hearing, that she sub-
mitted to the act of intercourse only after being slugged in the face 2 to 3 times with
sufficient force to leave bruises. We believe that this case, while it is not perhaps
sufficient to constitute a forcible rape, or at least the prosecutor who filed the
charges did not feel so, certainly approached that ...
Certainly the use of force, I feel, was the crucial factor in the prosecutor's
decision to file this case as a felony.
Transcript of Oral Arguments at 28, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
The testimony introduced at the preliminary hearing does indicate that the prosecutor
would have had difficulty proving a charge of forcible rape beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sharon and Michael engaged in sexual activity off and on for approximately three hours.
Although Sharon was aware of Michael's persistence in the face of any resistance on her
part, she chose to remain with him rather than go home with her sister. She initiated sexual
contact with a third boy and fully encouraged and consented to Michael's advances to the
point of intercourse. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
Justice Blackmun believed the facts of the case made it an unattractive one to prosecute
even as a misdemeanor violation of§ 261.5. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 485-86 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
211. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 467-68 n.!.
212. The use of force or coercion is explicitly noted in 14 of the 25 cases cited by the
Court: Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1979) (first act of intercourse between
defendant and junior high school teacher forced; victim subsequently intimidated by de-
fendant's age and status as teacher); Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976) (de-
fendant over 21 engaged in intercourse with virgin of 13); Hall v. State, 365 So. 2d 1249 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1978) (10-year-old victim abducted, beaten, and forcibly and repeatedly raped
by two adults), cer. denied, 365 So. 2d 1253 (1979); People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 551
P.2d 703 (1976) (12-year-old victim forcibly gang-raped by older youths; initial complaint
delayed because victim threatened with reprisal); State v. Brothers, 384 A.2d 402 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1978) (15-year-old victim forcibly raped by 27-year-old defendant); In re W.E.P.,
318 A.2d 286 (D.C. 1974) (13-year-old victim abducted and forcibly raped by three older
youths); Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 260 S.E.2d 40 (1979) (step-parent forcibly raped I 1-
year-old stepchild); State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1974) (29-year-old adult forced
16-year-old victim to submit at gunpoint to two acts of intercourse); In re J.D.G., 498
S.W.2d 786 (Mo. 1973) (teenage victim gang-raped); State v. Thompson, 162 N.J. Super.
302, 392 A.2d 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (20-year-old defendant engaged in inter-
course with 11-year-old victim); State v. Wilson, 296 N.C. 298, 250 S.E.2d 621 (1979) (forci-
ble rape of 9-year-old victim); State v. Elmore, 24 Or. App. 651, 546 P.2d 1117 (1976) (adult
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These cases, and Michael M. itself, illustrate that the need for a dis-
criminatory law is illusory. If the State commonly invokes section 261.5
in situations where the guilt of one party is apparent, it seems that the
substitution of a gender-neutral law would serve the state's interest as
effectively as one that discriminates on the basis of gender.
5. Conclusion
Had the Court been initially unwilling to disregard the State's con-
tention that pregnancy prevention was the actual goal of section 261.5,
the Court, as it did in Craig, could have tentatively accepted the State's
assertion for purposes of discussion. Then, after examining the peti-
tioner's showing as to the over and underinclusiveness of the classifica-
tion and its meager deterrent effect on the incidence of teenage
pregnancy, the Court might have found that pregnancy prevention
could not have been the actual goal underlying section 261.5. The
Court, however, reached an unsupportable result "by placing too much
emphasis on the desirability of achieving the State's asserted statutory
goal . . . and not enough emphasis on the fundamental question of
whether the sex-based discrimination in the California statute is sub-
stantialy related to the achievement of that goal."2 13 By not requiring
the State to offer proof that section 261.5 is to any degree a deterrent to
the proscribed behavior, much less that it serves as a more effective
deterrent than a gender-neutral statute, the Court avoided the proper
application of the intermediate scrutiny test.
C. Rationales for the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Statutes
that Discriminate Against Males
Although males as a class have not suffered the historic prejudice
that has been proffered as a justification for the application of height-
ened scrutiny to classifications based on race or female gender, discrim-
ination against males is objectionable because, like racial
discrimination, it is grounded on an "accident of birth." '214 Thus, all
classifications based on gender "deserve careful constitutional exami-
engaged in intercourse with 12-year-old victim who, frightened by defendant's size and age,
did not resist); State v. Ware, 418 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1980) (teenage victim kidnapped and raped by
adult defendant); Moore v. McKenzie, 236 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1977) (55-year-old defendant
engaged in intercourse with victim under 10 years of age).
213. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
214. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring); accord Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973): "[S]ince sex. . . is an immutable characteristic. . . the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex
would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
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nation" because of the danger that they may reflect assumptions about
the sexes that are not related to any inherent differences between men
and women.215
The Michael .A Court ignored the sexual victimization of young
boys216 and the fact that section 261.5 withholds from boys the protec-
tion it affords to girls.2 17 Although the Court realized that the law
places a burden on males which is not shared by their female partners,
the Court did not recognize a corresponding need to redress the dis-
crimination against boys that gender-based statutory rape laws have
perpetuated.2 18 MichaelM thus stands in sharp contrast to prior opin-
ions where the Court employed the same standard to review gender
discrimination aimed at males as that aimed at females.2 19 This is
ironic because Craig, the first case to set forth the standards of interme-
diate scrutiny, was a case in which the challenged statute expressly dis-
criminated against males.
Furthermore, laws that apparently discriminate only against males
on closer look often discriminate against females as well, and inquiry
into actual purposes and the means chosen to effectuate legislative
goals may uncover a more subtle form of discrimination against fe-
relationship to individual responsibility."' (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
215. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979): "Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and bur-
dens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection. . . . Thus, even statutes pur-
portedly designed to compensate for. . . the effects of past discrimination must be carefully
tailored." (citation omitted).
216. In his concurring opinion Justice Stewart cited studies that found 88% of sexually
abused minors to be female and concluded that female sexual abuse was the more serious
issue. MichaelM., 450 U.S. at 479 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). How-
ever, another study, not cited by the Court, reported that almost half as many boys as girls
are the victims of sexual abuse. D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN (1979).
The author concluded that "[als a result of our cultural stereotype, which casts men as sexu-
ally active and women as sexually passive, it has been possible to read more consent and less
exploitation into the adult-child liaisons of young boys than in the comparable experiences
of young girls." Id. at 68-69. This indicates that the very stereotypes perpetuated by laws
such as § 261.5 mask the extent of sexual abuse perpetrated on young males.
217. See also People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1975) (§ 261.5
constitutional even though it does not protect males under 18). "It would be unrealistic to
base a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the statute's classification of the protected class
upon a belief that girls of the age of the victim in this case [14] are no more likely than boys
of the same age to be the objects of the desires and designs of older people. . . who are on
the prowl." Id. at 760, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
218. MchaelM., 450 U.S. at 476.
219. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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males.22 ° Such inquiry led Justice Stevens to conclude that the statu-
tory discrimination against males challenged in Calfano v. Goldfarb
z2
was "merely the accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking
about females. 2 2
Finally, classifications that purport to protect females "carry the
inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of wo-
men and their need for special protection. 22 3 In Craig, Justice Rehn-
quist recognized the argument that "all discriminations between the
sexes ultimately redound to the detriment of females, because they tend
to reinforce 'old notions' restricting the roles and opportunities of
women."
224
By foregoing a careful analysis of statutory purpose and failing to
subject the relationship between the statute's purpose and its classifica-
tion to heightened scrutiny, the Court did not recognize that section
261.5 discriminates against females by perpetrating outmoded sexual
stereotypes.225 As Justice Mosk noted in his dissenting opinion, al-
though section 261.5 presumes that a female is able to consent to sexual
intercourse, it "impugns [her] capacity . . . to make such decisions
intelligentl. ..'-226
220. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147 (1980); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 208-09 (1977) (challenged statutes initially appeared to favor wo-
men and discriminate against men: widows received survivors' benefits regardless of depen-
dence on spouses while widowers had burden of proving such status; on closer examination
it apparent that respective statutes also discriminated against female wage earners, because
their beneficiaries received less); Arp v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d at 406, 563
P.2d at 855, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 299: "[Ilt is noteworthy that the conclusive presumption in
favor of widows discriminates not only against the widower but against the employedfemale
as well." (emphasis in original). Also, in Craig, the challenged statute was concerned with
male drinking, but the law did not reflect the same concern about or extend the same protec-
tion to females.
221. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
222. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring).
223. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). "Such classifications. . . have frequently been
revealed on analysis to rest only upon. . . 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations ..
Caliano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 211 (citations omitted).
224. 429 U.S. at 220 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225. The Court stated, without further analysis, that this was not a case where the gender
classification rested on "the baggage of sexual stereotypes." Michael M., 450 U.S. at 476
(quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979)). In contrast, one commentator has noted that
"[tihe stereotype of females as victims [has been] especially pervasive and damaging. By
legitimating [this stereotype], traditional statutory rape laws may [have aggravated] the dan-
ger that young females [would] acquiesce to sexual exploitation." Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 757, 770 (1980).
226. Michael M., 25 Cal. 3d at 624, 601 P.2d at 582, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 350 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Because she is a woman she is deemed inherently less capable of knowing the facts,
of controlling her emotions, of weighing the risks and benefits, and of making in-
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Although retention of section 261.5 may seem anachronistic in view
of the overwhelming national trend toward enactment of gender-neu-
tral statutory rape and sexual abuse laws, it is unlikely that any modifi-
cation of the gender-based status of section 261.5 will originate with the
judiciary.227 One situation that offers the possibility of a different result
is a case involving the prosecution of a statutory rape violation present-
ing facts unlike those in MichaelM.: e.g., a sexual act between mature,
consenting adolescents that occurred in the context of a longstanding
relationship, or an act of intercourse between a young male and an
older, sexually agressive, minor female.228 However, the prosecution of
a case presenting these hypothetical facts in an unequivocal manner is
unlikely to occur.229 But, if a defendant who initially appeared to be
the more culpable party were convicted despite contrary facts adduced
at trial, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitu-
tionality of section 261.5 might be sustained.2"' Alternatively, the pas-
telligent choices-in short, she is less responsible for her actions-than her male
counterpart. As it presently reads, the California statutory rape law thus reflects a
belief that the minor female is in need of special protection not only against the
male but also against herself, against her "voluntary" but presumptively imprudent
decisions in matters of sex.
Such notions are obviously vestiges of a bygone era, remnants of the exploded
myth of intrinsic male superiority. They are the product of conventional sex-stere-
otypical thinking, and revive an outmoded patriarchial [sic] view of "the woman's
role."
Id. (emphasis in original); accord Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973);
"[S]tatutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its
individual members."
227. The California court noted that "in all of those states which. . . have adopted a
neutral role, the change was effected in every instance by legislative action. Not a single
state has adopted such a rule byjudicial decree." MichaelM., 25 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 601 P.2d
at 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (emphasis in original).
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Michael M., the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has likewise upheld gender-based statutory rape laws similar to § 261.5.
Gray v. Raines, 662 F.2d 569, 570 (9th Cir. 1981) (Arizona statute, modeled on § 261.5, does
not violate equal protection); United States v. Hicks, 657 F.2d 244, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1981)
(reversing United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980), in light of United States v.
Sangrey, 648 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1981), and Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981)); United States v. Sangrey, 648 F.2d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1981) (federal statutory rape
law not significantly different from § 261.5, thus, constitutional).
228. The State implied that such facts might compel a different result but noted that peti-
tioner lacked standing to challenge § 261.5 in view of the factual setting in the instant case.
Brief of Respondent at 24, Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
229. Id.: "If and when a prosecutor in California commences a prosecution upon...
[such an] improbable factual pattern. . . the constitutionality of the statute as so applied
can then be considered."
230. In Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d
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sage of an equal rights amendment would authorize strict judicial
scrutiny of section 261.5 although the possibility remains that a future
court would continue to focus on the unique but irrelevant differences
between the sexes presented in Michael M. 231 In the absence of any of
these factors, the most probable avenue for a change in the gender-
based provisions of section 261.5 lies in its revision by the California
Legislature. The decision in Michael M may generate sufficient con-
troversy to promote such legislative reconsideration.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Michael M v. Superior Court,232 the United States Supreme
Court ignored crucial components of the intermediate scrutiny test es-
tablished to review challenges to gender-based statutes. First, the
Court accorded unwarranted deference to the California Supreme
Court's finding that pregnancy prevention is the purpose of the chal-
lenged statute. Because historical evidence, legal precedent, and the
language of the statute itself do not support the state court's finding,
precedent required the Court to conduct its own independent inquiry
into the actual purpose of section 261.5. Had it done so, the Court
would have found that the goal of the California Legislature in enact-
ing section 261.5 was to protect the virtue of adolescent females. The
Court would then have been expected to invalidate the statute on the
ground that its purpose is constitutionally impermissible.
Second, had the Court accepted, for purposes of discussion, the
state court's identification of pregnancy prevention as the purpose un-
derlying section 261.5, precedent would have required a persuasive
demonstration that this gender-based law is a more effective deterrent
to illegitimate teenage pregnancy than a comparable but gender-neu-
216 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981) (in light of Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)), rev', 657 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1981) (in light of United
States v. Sangrey, 657 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1981)); Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir.
1979); and Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950
(1978), defendants sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that the gender-based statutes
under which they were convicted violated equal protection.
231. Even though the imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of gender ignores the
issue of responsibility for the prohibited act, both courts found males and females not simi-
larly situated with respect to the risks of intercourse. The possibility remains that the unique
physical differences rationale could be successfully invoked to justify the discriminatory pro-
visions of § 261.5 even after passage of an equal rights amendment. See supra note 13.
Although such an amendment would authorize a court to employ a stringent standard of
review, the decision of the California Supreme Court in Michael M. v. Superior Court illus-
trates the result that occurs when a court frames the language of a case in terms of strict
scrutiny but actually applies a less rigorous standard of review.
232. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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tral statute. Because the State was unable to make such a showing, the
Court should have invalidated the statute on the ground that its classifi-
cation is not substantially related to its purpose.
Although the language of the case is framed in intermediate scru-
tiny terms, the Court's analysis is much closer to that employed under
the rational relationship test. It is apparent that Michael M signals a
retreat from the test the Court has established to ascertain the constitu-
tionality of gender-based classifications ostensibly aimed at males.
Frances J Sulman *
* The author wishes to thank Professor Christopher N. May for his assistance in the
preparation of this casenote.
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